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COMMENTS
THE JUVENILE OFFENDER-WHERE CAN WE
SEND HIM?
I.

Introduction

Americans are becoming increasingly aware of the immense problem crime presents in modern society and are fearful of both the
problem and the proposed solutions. While both sides in the 1968'
and 19722 presidential elections acknowledged the magnitude of the
malignancy, the method of solving it was a major controversy. "Permissiveness" and "police state" were the catchwords of the opposing
camps.
Yet the focus of the controversy should have been directed more
toward the fifteen year old child, since fifteen year olds commit the
largest proportion of crimes of any single age group.3 This statistic
presents an anomaly in New York State where persons less than
sixteen cannot be adjudicated criminals.' A person over seven and
less than sixteen is a juvenile delinquent (JD) if he or she "does any
act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." 5
A shccking statistic is that eighty percent of the persons convicted
for serious crimes as adults were previously convicted of a lesser
offense,' usually before reaching their majority.' It can be concluded
1. The controversy in 1968 concerned the ability and record of the Democrats in dealing with the crime problem, wiretapping, and the "Warren
Court." R. HARRIS, JUSTICE 26, 32, 49 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HARRIS].
2. In 1972 the controversy revolved around crime statistics. Nixon supporters claimed that the crime problem had abated. McGovern countered
with statistics from the previous three years showing that the problem had
grown and was raging out of control. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1972, at 30, col.
5.
3.

HARRIS

47.

4. "No adjudication under this article may be denominated a conviction, and no person adjudicated a juvenile delinquent or a person in need
of supervision under this article shall be denominated a criminal by reason
of such adjudication." N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 781 (McKinney 1963)
[hereinafter cited as N.Y.F.C.A.].
5. Id. § 712(a).
6.

HARRIS

47.
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that the criminal authorities know of the socially deviant propensities of most youthful offenders while they are within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile courts, but rehabilitative steps to change these criminal patterns have not been effectively implemented.
The Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement stated in 1967
that:
America's best hope for reducing crime is to reduce juvenile delinquency and
youth crime. In 1965 a majority of all arrests for major crimes against property were of people under 21, as were a substantial minority of arrests for
major crimes against the person. The recidivism rates for young offenders are
higher than those of any other age group. A substantial change in any of these
figures would make a substantial change in the total crime figures for the
Nation.'

Ever since the institution of the first family court in Cook County,
Illinois in 1899,1 the emphasis in juvenile delinquency cases has
been on rehabilitation. While various state statutes"' have man7, Here "majority" is being used in the context of being outside of the
juvenile court's jurisdiction.
8. A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
55-57 [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE].
9. P. HAHN, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER AND THE LAW 307 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as HAHN]. See ILL. LAWS, P. 131, §§ 1-26 (1899).
10. "The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each minor under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in
his own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the State; to preserve and
strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from
the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety and protection
of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and,
when the minor is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody,
care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should
have been given by his parents. This chapter shall be liberally construed
to carry out these purposes." CAL. WELF & INST'NS CODE § 502 (West
1972). "It is the intention of the legislature in enacting this act to increase
the protection afforded the citizens of this state, to permit a more even
administration of justice in the juvenile courts, to rehabilitate juvenile
offenders, and to reduce the necessity for commitment of juveniles to state
juvenile correctional institutions by strengthening and improving the supervision of juveniles placed on probation by the juvenile courts of this
state." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.06.010 (Supp. 1972). (1) Title. This
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dated attempts at rehabilitation and the family courts and youth
centers" have paid lip service to this goal, in most instances it has
not been achieved.
At their inception the juvenile courts operated under,a dual
theory of "best interests of the child"'" and parens patriae.'3 The
"best interests of the child" theory mandated that rehabilitation be
the primary goal of any corrective action the state may take. Any
such action necessarily had to be handled with kindness and consideration for the child's psychological and physical welfare.' 4 Vindication of the state's right could not enter into the picture, although
the element of protection of society while the child was being rehachapter may be cited as 'The Children's Code.' (2) Intent. It is declared
to be the intent of this chapter to promote the best interests of the children
of this state through: (a) Juvenile courts adequately equipped to review
each case on its individual merits under procedure designed to safeguard
the legal rights of the child and his parents; (b) An integrated and coordinated program for all delinquent, neglected and dependent children
both in their own community and while in the custody of the state;
(c) Protection of children from unnecessary separation, either temporary
or permanent, from their parents; (d) Adequate care and rehabilitation for
all children who must be separated from their parents temporarily for the
child's protection or that of the public; (e) Co-ordinated planning to assist
local communities in promoting effective programs in health, education,
recreation and welfare for the maximum development of all children and
for the control of influences detrimental to youth; (f) Assurance for children needing adoptive homes that they will be placed in the best home
available; protection of children from adoption by persons unfit to have
responsibility for raising a child; protection for children who are legally
established in adoptive homes from interference by their natural parents.
(3) Construction. This chapter shall be liberally construed to effect the
objectives in sub. (2). The best interests of the child shall always be of
paramount consideration, but the court shall also consider the interest of
the parents or guardian of the child and the interest of the public." Wis.
STAT. ANN.

11.
12.

§ 48.01 (1957).

N.Y. EXEC.
A

LAW

§ 502 (McKinney 1972).

REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
supra note 9, at 267.
14. Id. at 308-18 for a discussion of the failure of the "best interests of

AND YOUTH CRIME
13. See HAHN,

the child" theory.
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bilitated could be present." In order to implement these goals the
states traditionally used the doctrine of parens patriae,which precluded the necessity of granting the child all of the constitutional
safeguards that are afforded accused persons.'" This action was justified under the theory that the juvenile delinquency proceeding was
an equitable or civil action and not a criminal prosecution.' 7 Furthermore, it was felt that if the criminal safeguards were implemented the family court proceeding would be adversary in nature,"
with the child pitted against the state instead of the state attempting to help the child.
The two theories were not incompatible-in fact they should have
worked well. A certain symbiosis was to be effected whereby in
exchange for the waiver of constitutional rights the state promised
to rehabilitate the child with no thought of vindication. The state,
however, consistently failed in its efforts to rehabilitate. , The President's Commission on Law Enforcement stated in 1967:
Studies conducted by the Commission, legislative inquiries in various States,
and reports by informed observers compel the conclusion that the great hopes
originally held for the juvenile court have not been fulfilled. It has not succeeded significantly in rehabilitating delinquent youth, in reducing or even
stemming the tide of delinquency, or in bringing justice and compassion to
the child offender.20

Because of this failure there was increased agitation during the
15. Id. at 327. "While we see no legitimate place in juvenile corrections
for the kinds of vengeful motives mentioned above, we must not forget that
confinement for the protection of society or in order to enable an offender
to have sufficient time in a structured situation to develop inner behavioral
controls is necessary for some offenders." Id.
16. M. MIDONICK, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE COURTS: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, UNGOVERNABILITY AND NEGLECT 2 (1972); Paulsen, Fairness to the
Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957).
17. HAHN, supra note 9, at 307; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at
3-4; People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
18. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12, at 3; In re Samuel W., 24
N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, motion to amend remittitur

granted, 27 N.Y.2d 728, 262 N.E.2d 675, 314 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1970).
19.

See text accompanying note 6 supra.

20.

CHALLENGE,

supra note 8, at 80.
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1960s to grant due process to juvenile defendants.2 Consequently,
the use of the parens patriae doctrine was substantially limited in
the case of In re Gault," which established the minimum standards
of due process for juvenile defendants. These standards include the
rights to counsel,23 confrontation and cross examination,2 4 adequate
notice of the charges,2 5 and the privilege against self-incrimination
in court. " The unfortunate result of the Gault case is that family
court hearings to determine juvenile delinquency now definitely
contain some of the stigma of a criminal proceeding." Some states
have taken the precaution of limiting the access to family court
proceedings28 and records29 in order to protect the juvenile's reputation, but the psychological effect on the child of a criminal prosecution cannot be avoided by such a legislative decree.
The individual states now have the opportunity, before the juvenile delinquency proceedings attain all the accoutrements of a crim21. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-24 (1967); Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966) for a discussion of the failure of the juvenile
courts and the agitation for reform.
22. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court reversed and remanded an order of
incarceration of a 15-year-old who had made lewd phone calls. The reversal
was based on the state's failure to afford minimum due proces to the
defendant.
23. Id. at 41.
24. Id. at 57.
25. Id. at 33.
26. Id. at 55.
27. The inclusion of the right against self-incrimination is indicative of
the criminal aspects of the proceeding. The requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), undoubtedly demonstrates that the proceeding is criminal. In re Richard S., 27 N.Y.2d 802,
264 N.E.2d 353, 315 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1970) extended this standard of proof
to PINS.
28.

E.g., N.Y.F.C.A. § 784;

CAL. WELF.

&

INST'NS CODE

§ 675 (West

1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.091 (Supp. 1972).
29. E.g., under N.Y.F.C.A. § 783, use of family court records as evidence in another proceeding is prohibited but records may be used in
determination of sentence. Id. § 784. Police records of juvenile offenders
must be kept in a separate file and are to be released to certain specified
persons upon written order of the judge. See also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE §§ 825-27 (West 1972).
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inal trial, to reverse the trend' that limits the use of the parens
patriae theory. Perhaps, if wide-scale rehabilitation could ever be
achieved, the Supreme Court might be convinced to return to the
pre-Gault standards of due process in juvenile courts. As Professor
Hahn points out, "the juvenile court concept, as originally planned,
is not dead; it has simply in most instances never been tried."3
In 1962, New York revamped the jurisdiction of various courts to
bring a variety of family problems within the jurisdiction of the new
family court. :2 The court has jurisdiction over neglect,33 support,3 4
paternity, 5 family offenses,3" juvenile delinquency,37 conciliation,3"
adoption and parental rights proceedings. 3" New York's family
courts have jurisdiction over both juvenile delinquents and "persons
in need of supervision" (PINS), thus encompassing both categories
of juvenile offenders. New York's definition of these two categories
is:
(a) "Juvenile delinquent" means a person over seven and less than sixteen
years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a
crime.
(b) "Person in need of supervision" means a male less than sixteen years
of age and a female less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school
30. It should be noted that Gault has been extended in In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970) so that determinations of juvenile delinquency must
be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. New York requires the same
proof for ungovernability of PINS, another category of juvenile offenders.
See In re Richard S., 27 N.Y.2d 802, 264 N.E.2d 353, 315 N.Y.S.2d 861
(1970). The right to a jury trial, however, has been denied in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
31. HAHN, supra note 9, at 306.
32. Preface to N.Y.F.C.A. at III. Under this statute the family court
replaced "the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York and the
Children's Courts in the other counties." Id.
33. N.Y.F.C.A. art. 3.
34. Id. art. 4.
35. Id. art. 5.
36. Id. art. 8.

37. Id. art. 7.
38. Id. art. 9.
39. Id. art. 6. The only family problems not within the jurisdiction of
the family court are divorce, separation and annulments which are within
the state supreme court's jurisdiction. See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, §§ 7, 13.
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in accord with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education
and belaw or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient
40
authority.
lawful
other
or
parent
of
control
lawful
yond the

This comment will examine article 7 of the New York Family
Court Act which is concerned with both JDs and PINS. It will
recommend changes in this law and examine plans implemented in
other states and urban areas which have attempted to solve the
problem of the juvenile offender.

II. The Problem
As indicated above, the failure of juvenile courts is not so much
the fault of the courts or the judges, but results from the inability
of the courts to carry out their proper purposes. 4 There are two main
causes for this inability and both are related to finances. First, the
legislature that enacted the Family Court Act and the city governments that administer it have failed to appropriate sufficient funds
to operate the courts and rehabilitation centers adequately.2 Second, the public that elected the legislature has apathetically failed
3
to prod the lawmakers into appropriating sufficient funds. The
public's apathy may be caused by the public's ignorance of the
proportions of the problem.44
When a child is brought before the judge on a PINS or JD petition, the judge has a number of alternatives. He may, on his own
40. N.Y.F.C.A. § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1972). In re Patricia A., 31
N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972), ruled the classification
between male and female in § 712(b) unconstitutional. That ruling
should only affect the age requirements and the new law will probably set
the age of PINS at sixteen years old with no mention of the male-female
distinction.

41. "[The juvenile court] is simply being strangled by many factors
outside of itself over which it has little control; or it is being destroyed from
within by conditions over which it seems to have the right of control but
very little real ability to remedy." HAHN, supra note 9, at 306. See note 10
supra for various states' juvenile court purpose clauses.
42. Pousner, How Family Court Fails, N.Y. Daily News, July 26, 1972,
at 48, cols. 1-3 (this is the second part of a four part series which appeared
in the N.Y. Daily News from July 25-28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Pousner]. See also HAHN, supra note 9, at 311.
43. See HAHN 308-09.
44. See text accompanying notes 3, 6, 8 supra.
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motion, substitute a PINS petition for a JD petition or he may
substitute a neglect" petition for either a PINS or a JD petition.46
The judge apparently has this discretion in the interest of fairness
and to prevent undue harshness to the child when there are mitigating circumstances. After such substitution and after the case has
been heard, the judge has four basic alternatives: (1) dismissal of
the petition,47 (2) probation,48 (3) placement,4 9 or (4) commitment'
(JDs only). There are no statutory criteria to determine which disposition should be made except that the case must be dismissed if
the allegations are not established.5 ' The discretion lodged in the
45. N.Y.F.C.A. art. 10 (McKinney Supp. 1972). This article covers
neglected children. The substitution of a neglect petition for a PINS or JD
petition in effect switches the culpability from the child to the parent or
guardian. N.Y.F.C.A. § 716. But in both cases it is only the child who
may be institutionalized. Id. § 1052.
46. Id. § 716.
47. Id. § 751.
48. Id. § 757 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
49. Id. § 756 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
50. Id. § 758 (McKinney Supp. 1972). PINS may not be committed
under this section. The harshest disposition for PINS is placement
under § 756. The difference between "placement" and "commitment" is
that the former allows the child to be placed in his own home, or in the
custody of a relative, or another suitable person or the Commissioner of
Social Services or other authoized agencies including the Division for
Youth pursuant to N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 19 G (McKinney 1972); id. § 502;
N.Y.F.C.A. § 754 (McKinney Supp. 1972). N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 510(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1972) states that "such institutions shall be known as
'schools' and 'centers' . . . ." Under the term "commitment" the child is
put in an institution suitable for maintaining delinquent children operated
by any subdivision of the state, or in the custody of the Commissioner of
Social Services or of any. authorized agency. N.Y.F.C.A. § 758(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1972). Fifteen year olds who commit what would have
been a class A or B felony, had they been adults, are liable to be committed
to reformatories such as Westfield State Farm (male) or Elmira Reception
Center (female). Id. § 758(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972). Therefore the only
substantive difference is that PINS may not be put in a reformatory
and JD's may be put there only when they have committed grevious offenses. There is also a provision for suspending the judgment in accordance
with § 755 and for discharging the respondent with a warning. Id., § 754,
(PINS only).
51. N.Y.F.C.A. § 751.
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trial court as to disposition, however, is reviewable by superior
courts.52
At the point of disposition the whole process of dealing with
youthful offenders breaks down. A court administrator quoted in
Michael Pousner's four-part series, "How Family Court Fails,"
stated, "[t]he choice boils down to the training schools, which
means nothing, or probation, which also means nothing." 53 Pousner
continually decries the inadequacy of the solutions offered for the
youthful offenders. Interpreting the quoted court administrator, he
says:
What he means is that most family court judges now agree that the state
training schools are a failure, discharging kids later just as messed up as or
worse than when they entered. Probation, on the other hand, may mean as
little as one or two calls by a grossly overburdened probation officer."

In the early 1960's the New York legislature dealt with the problem of disposition of juvenile offenders. The New York Family Court
Act of 1962 was derived from certain provisions of the Children's
Court Act, Domestic Relations Court Act, New York City Criminal
Court Act and the Domestic Relations Law. 55 Some sections of the
act were new-notably section 711 which states the purpose of the
juvenile delinquency article:
The purpose of this article is to provide a due process of law (a) for considering a claim that a person is a juvenile delinquent or a person in need of
supervision and (b) for devising an appropriateorder of disposition for any
person adjudged a juvenile delinquent or in need of supervision."

Thus, the New York legislature was statutorily requiring due process five years before the Supreme Court constitutionally mandated
due process in Gault. This enactment can be seen as a chip at the
parens patriae doctrine, but at the same time, the legislature failed
in the Family Court Act to mandate the "best interests of the child"
doctrine. Perhaps the only word in section 711 indicating the latter
52. See also In re Edward S., 37 App. Div. 2d 977, 328 N.Y.S.2d 235
(2d Dep't 1971) where commitment, although legally permissible, was
overturned as an abuse of the court's discretion.
53. Pousner, supra note 42, pt. 3, July 27, 1972, at 62, col. 1.
54. Id.
55. N.Y.F.C.A. at XI (derivation table).
56. Id. § 711 (emphasis added).
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theory is "appropriate" as used to describe the dispositions available to the court. A reading of article 7 indicates a lack of compassion for the child." Nowhere in article 7 is there a mention of rehabilitation or "best interests of the child." Such language should
have been included by the legislature in sections 753 and 754 which
outline the appropriate dispositions. This approach should have
also been reflected in section 711, the purpose clause of article 7 and
section 712,18 the definition clause. However, the failure is somewhat
mitigated by court decisions59 and sections of the Executive Law'"
which describe the purposes of the centers to which PINS are sent
as "the care, treatment, education, rehabilitation and guidance of
youths . . . . "' Furthermore, the legislative committee that
drafted the new Family Court Act stated that the proceedings were
to remain civil"2 in nature and were to be designed to help rather
57. The statute's language makes no reference to a concern for the
child's best interests. See note 10 supra for a comparison with the statutes
of other states where the purpose or intent clause mandates rehabilitation
or the "best interests of the child."
58. Section 712 uses the word "incorrigible" to describe a PINS.
Although this word means "unmanageable by parents or guardians" when
used in relation to a juvenile, its primary meaning "incapable of being
corrected, amended, or improved" should indicate to the legislature that
its use is not warranted when dealing with a child under sixteen years of
age.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

907 (4th ed. 1951).

59. See, e.g., In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 197-99, 247 N.E.2d 253,
254-57, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415-17 (1969), where the court outlines the theoretical basis of the court's treatment of juvenile offenders; In re Edwin R.,
67 Misc. 2d 452, 454, 323 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911 (Fam. Ct. 1971), where the
court stated that it would not find a child to be a JD or a PINS unless
rehabilitation or protection was necessary.
60. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 502 (McKinney 1972) indicates a concern for
the interests of the child, but usually in a negative sense. For example,
§ 502(4) states that in the best interests of the child the center may refuse
to admit the child. This section could just as easily be utilized to exclude
a child in the best interests of the center. In fact, it is difficult to imagine
why this discretion should be left with the center rather than the judge if
the child's best interests are being guarded. Sections 413-15 set up a Youth
Commission partially to provide guidance in achieving rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders.
61. Id. § 502(i)(a).
62. Most recent cases say that the JD proceedings are at least quasi-
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than punish the child.63
A recent article entitled, "Because Society Won't Pay the Bill, It's
Often the Child Who Pays," quotes Irene Rosenburg, a former
children's law guardian, "4 as follows:
I want the judges to stop making believe to themselves and to the people
before them that they are performing any valid function .... They are
only staving off the problem. If a mother comes into court asking for help in
controlling her son, I want the judge to tell her the only available place is
the lock-up, like Spofford.
And I would want the judge to tell her that if her son is locked up, his life
will be regimented, he may encounter homosexual attacks, he may be beaten
up by a guard, he may try to kill himself, and he will have lived in a place
no child should have. In 10 days he'll be back, and the same problem will be
there.
And then, I would like the judge to say, "So if you want me to lock him
up, I'll do it, but this is all there is. Let us not say we can do things we can't.
Let us not call this help."

The article went on to state:
Like Judge Midonick, somes judges admit that the institutions are of
little value and will refuse to send children away when they believe nothing
can be done."

The Citizens Committee for Children of New York found the juvenile detention centers "wholly inappropriate and. . . often destruccriminal, In re Joseph S., 62 Misc. 2d 329, 308 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Fam. Ct.
1969); In re Kenneth M., 60 Misc. 2d 699, 303 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Fam. Ct.
1969); In re Dell, 56 Misc. 2d 1017, 290 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Fam. Ct. 1968).

63. Report of the Joint Legislative Comm. on Court Reorganization
[1962] MCKINNEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 3434.
64. "As used in this act, 'law guardian' refers to an attorney admitted
to practice law in the state of New York and designated under this part to
represent minors pursuant to section two hundred and forty-nine of this
act." N.Y.F.C.A. § 242 (McKinney Supp. 1972). "In a proceeding under
articles seven or ten, the family court shall appoint a law guardian to
represent a minor who is the subject of the proceeding if independent legal
representation is not available to such minor by reason of inability to pay
other counsel or other circumstances ...

"

N.Y.F.C.A. § 249 (McKin-

ney Supp. 1972).
65. Because Society Won't Pay the Bill, It's Often The Child Who
Pays, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1971, at 36, col. 4.
66. Id.
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tive of the children for whom they are maintained." 7 Several family
court judges have voiced similar conclusions. Judge M. Michael
Potoker of the family court said, "[Without proper resources, we
continue to be nothing but a prep school for the criminal
courts. . . ."'I Judge Philip D. Roach of Brooklyn's family court
stated, "[wjhat we've done to kids is just disgraceful, . . . [w]e
send them direct to the criminal courts, by our own inadequacies
and our inability to stop them when they start." 9 Another judge
merely said, "[tihings are careening out of control." 7' Pousner's
series indicates the basic problem to be that judges have no real
alternatives because the appropriate places to send the children do
not exist.7 ' Milton Luger, former Director of the New York State
Division of Youth, appearing before the Senate Subcommittee on
the Judiciary at its hearings on juvenile delinquency in 1969, stated:
With the exception of relatively few youths, it is probably better for all
concerned if young delinquents were not detected, apprehended, or institutionalized. Too many of them get worse in our care."

The conclusion should be obvious. The persons responsible for the
adjudication of juvenile delinquency and the operation of juvenile
facilities admit that the system is a failure. It is time for drastic,
immediate change.
67.

Id. at col. 2. For an analysis of the abuses at the detention centers,
R. RUSKIN & D. GOFF, AN INQUIRY INTO THE JUVENILE CENTERS

see J. STONE,

(1971), reported in accordance with
the Order of the Appellate Divisions of the First and Second Judicial
Departments dated July 17, 1970 [hereinafter cited as INQuIRY].
OPERATED BY THE OFFICE OF PROBATION

68.

Pousner, supra note 42, pt. 3, July 27, 1972, at 62, col. 1.

69. Oelsner, Juvenile Justice, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1973, at 28, col. 1
(this is the first part of a four part series which appeared in the N.Y. Times
from Apr. 2-5, 1973).

70. Pousner, supra note 42, pt. 2, July 26, 1972, at 48, col. 3.
71. "Finally, when the judge does make his ruling, it's with the sad
knowledge that, in most situations, there's very little he can offer in the
way of salutary services the youngster needed when he initially entered
the system." Id. at col. 2.
72. Hearings on S. Res. 48 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 20, at 5194 (1969).
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The New York legislature is not unaware of the problem. Assemblyman Antonio G. Olivieri has recently written a report 3 for submission to the New York legislature to help define the problems of
article 7 of the Family Court Act. Steps are also being taken to solve
the deficiencies of the institutions that are failing to rehabilitate.
Two of the major problems of these institutions have been their size
and their geographic placement. For the most part the state training
schools used for commitment have been large institutions set up in
rural or semi-rural areas, far from the problems of the inner city
from which the majority of the children come. New York City's
detention centers have likewise been large and have lacked community interaction. New York City's Director of Institutions and
Facilities, Wayne R. Mucci, has stated that "the city intends to
replace within five years all large detention facilities. . . ."" and
substitute for them small community based centers. 5 The State of
New York should commit itself to a similar plan. Herein lies the
basis of a possible solution to the Family Court's problems.
III.

The Solution

"Whenever a youngster gets into serious difficulty, the first question seems to be 'Where can we send him?' "76 Most specialists today
are indicating that home or community-based rehabilitation centers
are the proper answer." Assemblyman Olivieri states that the
73. A. Olivieri, The Process by Which New York Deals with Juvenile
Delinquents and Persons in Need of Supervision: Some Proposals for
Change (July 11, 1972) (unpublished report available from the assemblyman).
74. Id. at 56. As of Jan. 19, 1972 three of these small centers were
already open. Id. at 56-57 n.2. Since then a number of.small units, with
diversified aims, have been opened by the New York State Division of
Youth. See Note, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 624, 636-38 (1973). But the facilities
are still inadequate in number, capacity and diversity. Id. at 638-44. On
the present inadequacy of the facilities see generally Oelsner, supra note
69, at pts. 3 & 4, Apr. 4, 5, 1973.
75. Olivieri, supra note 73, at 56.
76. HAHN, supra note 9, at 334.
77. Citizens' Comm. for Children of New York, Inc., The New York
State Training School System 6 (Dec. 15, 1969) (unpublished report available from the Committee) [hereinafter cited as Citiz. Comm.]; INQUIRY,
supra note 67, at 21-24; HAHN, supra note 9, at 337-43; J.MARTIN, J. FITZPA-
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"ideal" involves treatment, and not punishment, in small, generally
unlocked, non-resident facilities located in the child's community
which must be visited by the child on a regular basis."8 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement in 1967 recommended:
Communities should establish neighborhood youth-serving agencies-Youth
Services Bureaus-located if possible in comprehensive neighborhood community centers and receiving juveniles (delinquent and non delinquent) referred by the police, the juvenile court, parents, schools, and other sources."

The need for community based rehabilitation centers in any large
urban area should be evident. The state, in utilizing the large centralized institution, aimed at eventually releasing a law abiding
child. However, this idea presents a contradiction in that some of
the children, namely PINS, are often confined for asocial rather
than unlawful conduct in the strict sense.
The weakness of this well intentioned approach is the misapplication of the theory of socialization. After traumatically withdrawing
the juvenile from his familiar environment, the state then puts the
acknowledged asocial youth in an artificial community made up of
other asocial youths. Normal socialization is hardly a likely outcome."' Moreover, the possible conflict between the values of the
majority and the different but lawful values of the juvenile's minority culture must be considered in developing programs for the treatment of juvenile offenders. All too often the dominant society imposes its own value system upon the minority group "as if society
were unanimously agreed about what was right and what was
'wrong' . . . .,"" What may happen is that the values in the juvenile's minority culture which are lawful may be disregarded in the
dominant society and not encouraged in the rehabilitation centers.
On the other hand, the values of the dominant society which are
TRICK

& R.

GOULD, THE ANALYSIS OF DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR: A STRUCTURAL

184-85 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANALYSIS]; CHALLENGE, supra
note 8,at 83.
78. Olivieri, supra note 73, at 40.
79. CHALLENGE, supra note 8, at 83.
80. On the theory of socialization see T. PARONS & R. BALES, FAMILY
APPROACH

SOCIALIZATION AND INTERACTION PROCESS

(1955); Socialization, The Law,

and Society, 27 J. Soc. ISSUES 1, 1-230 passim (no. 2, J. Tapp ed. 1971).
81. ANALYSIS 12.
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different from those of the minority culture are encouraged and the
acceptance of those values is considered 'progress' in rehabilitation.
The result is that, in addition to eliminating his asocial or antisocial
behavior, the child is also expected to reject his minority culture
and acquire the value system of the dominant society. Commentators on the weakness of this approach have stated:
It is, then, a common sociological principle that the degree of conformity to
legal prohibitions against traditional forms of crime and delinquency in a
given community is positively correlated with the strength of the 'fit' between
the people in a community and the conventional institutions operating
there."

Before rushing headlong into new programs for juvenile offenders
patterned on those of the past, the state should consider the conflicting value systems facing the juvenile offenders." For example,
"[t]he problems of culture conflict are fairly obvious for the Puerto
Rican youth. He is caught between the cultural expectations of an
urban American society and those of a Puerto Rican society from
which his parents have often migrated."84
Community-based rehabilitation centers could solve the problem
and also become prevention centers where parents could bring their
children for help before situations evolve into criminality.85 Despite
the fact that it is usually the parents who initiate the PINS petitions,"' locally centered rehabilitation groups would contain trained
employees from the local community and would thus operate as a
substantial mitigating factor in alleviating the child's dilemma. The
commentators herein quoted maintain that "[dielinquent behavior . . . is best understood in terms of the total motivational82.

Id. at 148-49.

83.

See notes 74-77 supra.
ANALYSIS 161. See also Oelsner, supra note 69, pt. 2, Apr. 3, 1973,

84.

at 32, col. 1-2.
85. Perhaps many of the juvenile offender cases should not be in court
at all; see the alternatives offered in the East Palo Alto plan and the
Olivieri plan infra.
86.

REPORT OF THE ADMIN. BD. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK FOR THE JUDICIAL YEAR JULY 1, 1970 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1971, at 35758 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 JUD. CONF. REP.] as cited in Olivieri,
supra note 73, at 3 n.1.
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situational-culturalcomplexes within which it occurs." 7 If we are
to aim at treatment and rehabilitation as the goal, the small locallyrun rehabilitation center seems mandatory. New York City is attempting to abolish large institutions, but given the exigency of the
situation, is the contemplated five year target for transition to
smaller institutions soon enough?
The large institutions built in the past are monuments to obsolete
ideas. Although well intentioned, the theories upon which they were
based are today seriously questioned, if not completely rejected, as
workable models. In order to keep the smaller institutions of the
future from suffering the same fate, they should be built on a theory
of "planned obsolescence" with replacement scheduled every five to
ten years. At the very least they should be flexible institutions
capable of being easily converted to fit newly arrived at insights and
the new demands of future behavior and societal patterns. "Planned
obsolescence," ordinarily a derogatory charge against Detroit automobile manufacturers, has merit in the field of juvenile detention
where no totally effective solution has been reached and where the
variety and number of somewhat successful plans are quite mini8
mal. 9
Relating this theory to New York's plan for a five year conversion
to smaller institutions and to the burgeoning crime rate in the
United States (especially among ethnic minorities in the cities), one
realizes the urgency of the situation and the flexibility that will be
necessary to solve the rehabilitation problem. Perhaps the legislature would be well advised to consider and implement, on a trial
basis, a variety of plans. Of course, the costs to the state and the
cities would be high, but the problem has reached such proportions
that the necessary monies must be spent. A typical present annual
rate of expenditure for each child incarcerated in a state institution,
operating at full capacity, is $10,000. 0 In a New York Times article,
87.

Id. at 16.

88.

THE UNITED NATIONS, THE YOUNG ADULT OFFENDER

99 (1965).

89. Cf. A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 128-35, 143-44 (1970) in regard to the
rate of turnover of institutions and organizations in our society today.
90. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1972, at 37, col. 3. This figure is from Massachusetts and was offered by Dr. J. Miller, Commissioner of Youth Services
of the State of Massachusetts.
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Jerome Miller, commenting about these costs, pointed out that
$10,000 is "enough to send a child to Harvard with a $100-a-week
allowance, a summer vacation in Europe, and once-a-week psychotherapy."1 If New York residents and legislators are willing to
pay that amount for ineffective institutions, great improvements
should mitigate the bickering over rising costs. 2
The remainder of this comment will be devoted to descriptions of
plans that are presently working well and will consider proposals
that seem to contain the necessary elements for a constructive revision of the Family Court Act and the achievement of rehabilitative
aims. None of these plans are panaceas but are merely offered as
examples of different and valid approaches.
A.

East Palo Alto Plan93

East Palo Alto, California, a mostly black community of 19,000
persons with a large juvenile delinquency problem, instituted a
quasi-judicial panel composed of six young persons ranging in age'
from 16 to 29 as an alternative to juvenile court action. 4 Appearance
before the panel is wholly voluntary, but if the youth refuses, he
may be liable to appear in juvenile court. The decision of the panel
is likewise not binding on the child and the remedial "punishment"
or chore assigned to the child may be rejected, but with a similar
liability to juvenile court proceedings. Children are referred to the
panel by parents, police, schools and probation officers. No child
has yet objected to a decision of the panel. The panel operates in
conjunction with the courts in that the police and probation officers
who have authority to bring the child before the court may instead
select the panel to deal with the child's offense. This is a "great tool
for handling minor or first offenses," commented juvenile court
Judge Lyle B. Edson.95 The plan has been so effective that it has
reduced" the recidivism rate of those using it to seven percent as
91. Id.
92. New York's costs vary from about $8,000 to $11,000 a year per child.
See Citiz. Comm., supra note 77, at 3.
93. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1972, at 13, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as East
Palo Alto].
94. Id.
95. Id. at col. 5.
96. The article indicated that the recidivism rate had gone down but
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opposed to a national average of seventy-four percent. 7
Of course the plan would be impractical to attempt on a city-wide
basis in a metropolis like New York. The plan however, is worth
trying in a small ethnically homogeneous section of the city with a
high juvenile delinquency rate. It would be most effective in PINS
or JD cases that involve minor offenses." Since the plan would be
tried on a limited basis at first, it would seem practical to draw the
boundaries of the panel's jurisdiction along police precinct lines or
school district lines.99 The court also should be allowed, by statute,
to refer the child to the panel in lieu of dismissing the petition.""0
Remedial punishment could help solve such problems as the graffiti
with which New York City is presently wrestling. Small remunerative jobs could be assigned from which the child could earn money
to repay the cost of items that were shoplifted or to repair property
or premises that were vandalized. With petitions that normally
would be PINS petitions but which are closely associated with neglect actions,'"' in that the real culpability lies with the parents, the
panel could determine that the "punishment" would be three
months of mandatory daily attendance at the YMCA or PAL or
similar institution. The punishment in all cases should be geared to
remedy the wrong and the cause of the act.
the previous recidivism rate was unavailable. Id.
97. Id., at col. 6, quoting Robert B. Evans, director of the Community
Youth Responsibility Program. Schenectedy, New York has a similar plan
to divert juveniles from the court system. See Oelsner, supra note 69, pt.
4, Apr. 4, 1973, at 41, col. 3.

98. This idea should be considered in conjunction with Assemblyman
Olivieri's plan for eliminating PINS and consolidating JD offenses and
violations. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
99. These lines of jurisdiction are thought to be practical since, excluding parents, schools and police are the most common petitioners in PINS
cases. See 1972 JuD. CONF. REP., supra note 85.
100. See N.Y.F.C.A. § 751.
101.

Id. art. 3. See also note 33 supra and N.Y.F.C.A. § 716 (McKin-

ney 1963) (Advisory Comm. Comments). "Paragraph (b) recognizes that
children who are 'delinquent' or 'in need of supervision' often are 'neglected' and are better treated that way." Id.
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Olivieri Plan"2

New York Assemblyman Antonio Olivieri from Manhattan's east
side has written a report for the Democratic Task Force on Corrections. Olivieri's most striking idea is the expansion of the category
of juvenile delinquent to include "offenders""' ' : while eliminating the category of PINS from the jurisdiction of the family court.
The reasoning used is that PINS pose little or no immediate
threat to the community and PINS offenses do not merit the quasicriminal stigma they have attained. Since the child is subject to loss
of liberty upon a finding that he is a "person in need of supervision,"
the due process requirements of Gault should likewise apply.'" 4 Because of these due process requirements the PINS adjudications
have similarly attained at least quasi-criminal aspects.
Assemblyman Olivieri seems willing to admit that the juvenile
delinquency proceeding is criminal in nature and involves vindica102. Assemblyman Olivieri states that few of the ideas are his own but
are rather a compilation of ideas from other commentators that he credits
in his report. Olivieri, supra note 73, at 69-70.
103. See Olivieri, supra note 73, at 23-32. The definition of juvenile
delinquents excludes minor offenses or violations which are criminal in
nature and are part of the penal code. N.Y.F.C.A, § 712(a) says that
" 'juvenile delinquent' means a person over seven and less than sixteen
years of age who does an act which, if done by an adult, would constitute
a crime." But the revised Penal Code made disorderly conduct and harrassment only "violations," not crimes. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.20-.25
(McKinney 1967). The word crime includes only felonies and misdemeanors, Id. § 10.00. The legislature passed a bill including offenses within the
family court jurisdiction, but the Governor vetoed it. See In re David W.,
34 App. Div. 2d 1100, 312 N.Y.S.2d 544 (4th Dep't 1970), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d
589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1971), which discussed the gap left
by failing to include violations within the definition of juvenile delinquency or persons in need of supervision. See also

MIDONICK,

supra note

16, at 10.
104. See In re Michael E., 68 Misc. 2d 487, 490, 327 N.Y.S.2d 84, 87
(Fain. Ct. 1971) where the difference between JD and PINS adjudication
is acknowledged but a demand for the same due process is upheld. In In
re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973) the
New York Court of Appeals ruled that PINS may not be incarcerated with
JDs in "training schools." Essentially this means that separate facilities
must be provided for PINS and JDs.
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tion or at least protection of the rights of society.'"5 However, the
behavior of a truant child or an habitually disobedient child poses
little threat to society and surely not enough of a threat to warrant
a court proceeding "against" the child. It is interesting to note that
the parents of difficult children bring well over half of the PINS
petitions and the schools almost another quarter.'"' Admittedly,
family court exists for the solution of family problems, but the criminal trappings that both PINS and JD proceedings have acquired,
especially through their categorization in one section," 7 are unfortunate. The assemblyman would, alternatively, institute "family
reception centers"'0 ' where the parents would bring the children who
presently fall into the PINS category. These centers would refer the
child to the appropriate city agency that deals with the type of
problem the child has. There is presently no statutory requirement
that the family courts be utilized before a referral is made to these
city agencies, but in reality it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get help from the city agencies without a court order. 00
Judge Midonick disagrees with the idea of removing PINS from
the family court jurisdiction because he feels that "[ilt sometimes
takes the black robe of the juvenile court judge to motivate a child
or parent to accept community resources.""' 0 Since it is usually the
parent who institutes the petition, the aura of judicial authority,
which Judge Midonick feels is important, is often outweighed by the
stigma a judicial proceeding involves. This should be avoided when
another means can achieve the same end. The Olivieri plan, eliminating the PINS category, should be considered in conjunction with
the Palo Alto plan which might help to fill the need for aid in
borderline PINS and JD cases.
Two other proposals the Olivieri report offers should be legislatively required. First, the maximum amount of time that the child
can be confined for a juvenile delinquency conviction should be
105. Olivieri, supra note 73, at 32, 39.
106. 1972 JUD. CONF. REP., supra note 85.
107. N.Y.F.C.A. § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
108. Olivieri, supra note 73, at 27-32.
109. Id. at 26 n.1. Because there are so many children with problems
in New York City the agencies that take care of PINS are loathe to give
aid to parents or schools without a court order. Id.
110. MIDONICK, supra note 16, at 177.
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limited to the period an adult could be confined for the same offense."' The dispositions allowed upon the adjudication that a person is a JD or a PINS both include "[c]ontinuing the proceeding
and placing the respondent .
*...""'
These placements are initially
for a period of eighteen months but successive placements may be
granted against the child's will until the child is eighteen, if male,
or twenty, if female."' The different treatment that can be accorded
adults and children gives rise to a constitutional issue of equal protection on which there is substantial disagreement."' A similar
issue exists with respect to the different treatment accorded male
5
and female children."
The Olivieri report also recommends"' that the rehabilitation
process and the restrictions imposed be analogous to those demanded in Wyatt v. Stickney" 7 where the court ordered that mentally retarded persons, who become wards of the state, shall have a
right to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the
purposes of rehabilitation.
The last two proposals do not contradict the previously discussed
proposal that we should consider a return to the pre-Gault standards of dealing with JD's and PINS. Rather, the New York legislature, as an indication of its awareness of the failure of rehabilitation efforts, should legislatively require that adjudicated JD's and
PINS receive no longer incarceration than an adult would receive,
111. Olivieri, supra note 73, at 39. See also the holding in In re Wilson,
438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970), and note 118 infra.
112. N.Y.F.C.A. §§ 753(b), 754(c).
113. Id. § 756(b), (c).
114. See MIDONICK, supra note 16, at 140-41. Compare Packnett v.
United States, 435 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that there is no constitutional violation in imposing an indeterminate sentence on a juvenile)
with In re Brown, 439 F.2d 47 (3rd Cir. 1971) (juvenile's four year sentence
for petit larceny violated the equal protection clause when an adult could
only be sentenced to one year and the juvenile's right of appeal had been
cut off) [and] In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 432, 264 A.2d 614, 618 (1970).
115. N.Y.F.C.A. § 756(c) (McKinney 1963). The constitutionality of
the male-female classification is now seriously in question due to the recent
New York Court of Appeals decision, In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286
N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972). See note 40 supra.
116. Olivieri, supra note 73, at 46.
117. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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and that this incarceration be operated under the least restrictive
conditions necessary. Such requirements would only exist until the
rehabilitation centers have shown that they are effective., 8 Hopefully after a few years the legislature could return to a parenspatriae
approach in such areas as indeterminate sentences or sentences
which are longer than those adults would receive for the same offense. In the meantime the state must prove that it can and will
rehabilitate. To act otherwise, and have the juveniles be the guinea
pigs of unproven rehabilitative efforts or to continue with indeterminate sentences in institutions that have proven themselves to be
nonrehabilitative, would be an error of monstrous proportions.
C.

Savoy Plan

One of the stated purposes of the JD and PINS article in the
Family Court Act is "for devising an appropriateorder of disposition
for any person adjudged a juvenile delinquent or in need of supervision.""' The word "appropriate" has not undergone judicial interpretation but it refers to the possible dispositions open to the
court."" There are five "appropriate" dispositions allowed.,', The
concern here is centered on the dispositions that place' or commit"' the child. If the facility that is to receive the child is not going
to rehabilitate and historically has a very high recidivism record,
placement with that facility should not be termed "appropriate."
The Family Court Act provision dealing with actual placement 4
refers to the Executive Law" ' for the facilities to be utilized. The
express purpose of these facilities is the "training, care and rehabili118. In re Wilson, 438 Pa. 425, 432, 264 A.2d 614, 618 (1970) held that
a child could only be detained for a longer time than an adult when it is
"clear that the longer commitment will result in the juvenile's receiving
appropriate rehabilitative care and not just in his being deprived of his
liberty for a longer time" (footnote omitted).
119. N.Y.F.C.A. § 711(b) (emphasis added).
120. Id. §§ 753-54.
121.

These are (1) discharge, (2) suspended judgment, (3) placement,

(4) commitment, and (5) probation of the respondent. Id.
122. Id. §§ 753(b), (d), 754(c) and § 756 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
123. Id. §§ 753(d), 758 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
124. Id. § 756(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
125. N.Y. EXEC. LAw art. 19 G (McKinney 1972) in particular §§ 502,
505, 510 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
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tation of children adjudicated as juvenile delinquents or as persons
in need of supervision ..
.'"I'
". When the agencies are not fulfilling
their stated purposes and the court feels that the indicated disposition is therefore not "appropriate," the court should be free to correct the abuses by way of injunction' 2 -either mandatory, in ordering that the facility operate in a certain prescribed way, or prohibitory in enjoining certain proscribed abuses.
In re Savoy' 8 was a District of Columbia case on a petition similar
to habeas corpus where two juveniles sought release from a city
detention center on the grounds that the home was run in a manner
which made it an unacceptable place for children to inhabit. The
center was extremely overcrowded and lacked adequate recreational, sanitary, educational and medical facilities. Solitary confinement was commonplace. In Savoy the court did not release the
juveniles upon finding that the facilities were unfit, but rather ruled
that all detention in the facility for periods in excess of two years
would be prohibited' 9 and ordered that certain low cost improve126. Id. at § 511(1) (McKinney 1972).
127. These injunctions would be issued after a hearing on the abuses
at which the agency or institution would be represented. Ex parte
temporary restraining orders would only be issued for clear violation of
statutes or gross abuses of discretion.
128. 98 DAILY WASH. LAW RPTR. 1937 (Oct. 30, 1970). The Savoy decision concerned pre-trial detention where the court's jurisdiction is easier
to establish. N.Y.F.C.A. § 756 has been interpreted as giving the court
continued jurisdiction over the placed child up to the expiration of the
initial sentence. Until that date the sentence may be extended but may
not be retroactively extended after the expiration of the sentence. Id. See
People ex rel. Schinitsky v. Cohen, 34 App. Div. 2d 1020, 1021, 312
N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1012 (2d Dep't 1970).
129. 98 DAILY WASH. LAW RPTR. at 1944-45. The effect of the court order
was tantamount to (1) an injunction closing the facility, or (2) an injunction ordering the construction of a new facility, or (3) an injunction ordering correction of abuses. The date for closing the home was October,
1972. The order was followed, In re Savoy, Juv. No. J-4808-70 (Super. Ct.
D.C., decided Jan. 12, 1973), where the court denied a request by the
District of Columbia for an extension. Id. at 8. The action closest to this
in New York was taken in Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) where the court declared that the conditions at the maximum security center Manida violated the eighth amendment guarantee against cruel

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. II

ments be immediately implemented.'30 A commentator on
Savoy decision stated that, "[1]t is believed that Savoy opens
door to action by the Juvenile Court that is based solely on
court's duty to ensure that its wards receive rehabilitative and
3
mane treatment."' '

the
the
the
hu-

The case should have far-reaching impact on juvenile right-to-treatment law
in terms of (1) the remedies it establishes; (2) its effort to set meaningful
standards of child care in detention facilities; and (3) because of the theory,
implicit and explicit, from which the court derives its authority to supervise
the administrators of the Home.
The fundamental assumption underlying Chief Judge Greene's opinion is
that the juvenile court has the responsibility and authority to ensure that its
wards receive good care.'32

The right-to-treatment law referred to above reflects the growing
practice of the courts to order agencies to either release the petitioner or provide proper care.' 33 The significance of the Savoy decision is that it authorizes the court under its general powers to supervise the centers to which children are sent. Savoy is a vast extension
of the previous right-to-treatment cases, which dealt more with particularized defects or abuses at the centers.'34 The Savoy case parand unusual punishment. Despite the fact, as the judge noted, the federal
authorities had determined ten years prior, that the facility was beyond
repair, however, Manida was still in use in April, 1973. See Oeslner, supra
note 69, pt. 3, Apr. 4, 1973, at 86, col. 6.
130. These included expanding the number of teachers, purchase of
materials, limitations on the population at the home, and strict regulation
of disciplinary isolation. 98 DAILY WASH. LAW RPTR. at 1942-43.
131. Note, 17 How. L.J. 443 (1972).
132. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
133. See, e.g., Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967) and In re
Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967) where the court ordered psychiatric
treatment; White v. Reid, 126 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1954) and United
States ex rel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17 (D. Conn. 1959) where
separate facilities for adults and children were mandated; People ex rel.
Berdauger v. Morrow, 60 Misc. 2d 189, 302 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1969)
where drug therapy was ordered; Lollis v. Department of Social Serv., 322
F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) where solitary confinement was prohibited.
For an extensive bibliography concerning the right to treatment cases see
Note, 17 How. L.J. 443, 446-49, nn.12-19 (1972).
134. Note, 17 How. L.J. 443, 449-50 (1972).
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tially turned on a statute 3 ' that required the court to assign the
child to a facility that approximates the care that the child should
have received at home. 3" The court also derived authority for its
action from the "general authority under the Juvenile Court Act."' 37
This general authority inheres in the court when it utilizes the
theory of parens patriae and the promise of rehabilitative treatment.' 3 The promise of treatment in the best interests of the child,
in exchange for waiver of certain constitutionally protected rights,
cannot be made if it is an idle promise which the court cannot keep.
The New York legislature should include language in section 711
of the Family Court Act specifically stating that the purpose of the
Act includes a mandate for care and rehabilitation of the child.139
Furthermore, the legislature should enact a statute as part of the
Family Court Act which clearly states that a family court judge has
the authority to supervise the centers to which he orders children
sent.'4 Obviously the function of the judge is not to operate and
supervise rehabilitation centers, but this supervision could be exercised whenever a right-to-treatment case is brought by the juvenile
detainee. As Judge Midonick states:
Although the role of evaluator of facilities is primarily legislative and executive in nature, it can profitably be performed in an adversary proceeding.
There is often no better way to test and highlight the adequacy of various
treatment alternatives then by consideration of specific cases. Self-inspection
by the executive branch of government is usefully checked and balanced by
a discrete and impartial branch, i.e., the judicial branch, on complaint of the
person incarcerated.' 4'
135.

D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN.

§ 16-2316(3) (1966).

136. Compare D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-2316(3) (1966) which is
based on the "best interests of the child" theory with N.Y.F.C.A. § 711,
[and] the § 764 petition to terminate placement or commitment,
[and] § 767(b) terminating placement or commitment when it no longer
serves the purpose of the act.
137. In re Savoy, 98 DAILY WASH. LAW RPTR. at 1944.
138. Note, 17 How. L.J. 443, 452 (1972).
139. See other state statutes supra note 10.
140. There would be no jurisdiction problem due to continuing jurisdiction. See note 128 supra. See also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 509 (West
1972) which requires the Juvenile Court judges to make annual inspections
of all facilities to which they send children and authorizes the judge to
close the facility unless any abuses found are remedied.
141. MIDONIcK, supra note 16, at 25.
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Joining the Savoy theory and Judge Midonick's statement, the right
of the judge to supervise is much broader than remedying the particularized defect. The authority to supervise, however, should only
become operative when there was a "right to treatment" complaint
or when the legislature ordered a judicial inspection of the facility.
Such a law would not only statutorily enact an authority the judge
already has, but also would encourage the judges to use this authority.
IV.

Budgetary Considerations

Inevitably, money is a prime factor in the proposed restructuring
of any large bureaucracy. Closing down large facilities and opening
small community-based centers, greatly expanding the number of
officers and court personnel, setting up planning boards and evaluating committees, and restructuring the bureaucracy so that it can
operate in the new structure-all appear to make a solution fiscally
impossible. The federal government, however, has allotted large
amounts of money in the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Act of
1972112 to help strengthen the juvenile justice system and the rehabilitation centers. Since 1968, Congress has authorized yearly allotments for such programs.'43 Partially because of inadequate data,'44
New York State has not taken full advantage of these available
monies. By these acts the federal government authorized $25 million
for fiscal year 1969; $50 million for 1970; and $75 million for each
following year until June 30, 1974.15 In the fiscal years 1969 and 1970
New York State received a total of $1,350,000 for twenty-seven different projects.' None of these projects were aimed directly at rehabilitation.' 7 Admittedly, New York took the largest share of any
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3801-91 (Supp. 1973) superseding Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3801 (1971).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 3882 (Supp. 1973).
144. Pousner, supra note 42, pt. 2, at 48, July 26, 1972, col. 3, where it
is noted that the court's inadequate records and statistics have precluded
federal grants.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 3882 (1968), as superseded by, 42 U.S.C. § 3882
(Supp. 1971), as amended by, 42 U.S.C. § 3882 (Supp. 1973).
146. Hearings on H.R. 6247 before Gen. Subcomm. on Educ. of the
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1971).

147. Id. Most were under the categories of "prevention" and "short
term training."
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state," but this was within the congressional intent. The federal
statute orginally stated that no state may take more than 15 percent
of the total authorized funds in one year. 49' This was reduced in 1972
to 12 percent.'50 Therefore, it was within the contemplation of Congress that an individual state with a serious juvenile delinquency
problem could claim a grant totaling $3.75 million in 1969; $7.5
million in 1970; $11.25 million in 1971 and 1972; and $9 million in
1973 and 1974.'1' New York's requests did not approach these figures." 2
In the legislative history of the 1971 act it is stated:
In fiscal 1970, for example, $50 million was authorized under the Juvenile
Delinquency Prevention and Control Act. However, only $15 million was
requested and only $10 million appropriated. In fiscal 1971, $75 million was
authorized, $15 million requested, and $15 million appropriated.'53

New York has been guilty, along with most other states, in failing
to take advantage of these available funds.
The funding allotted for programs dealing with juvenile delinquency has three major categories of recipients: states, local communities, and non-profit private agencies.'54 The amount granted
could equal 100 percent of the cost of the program.'5 5 The small
community-based plans suggested in the beginning of this comment
would be within the guidelines of the act.
The State of New York itself could also enhance the effort by
offering financial incentives to the local communities or counties to
deal with their juvenile delinquency problems. The states of California and Washington have instituted programs whereby the state
repays the county for the salary of its probation officers depending
148. Id. at 181-83.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 3883 (1968).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 3883 (Supp.1973).
151. These figures are arrived at by multiplying the allotment figures
inthe text accompanying note 145 supra, by the percentages inthe text
accompanying notes 149-50 supra.
152. See note 146 supra.
153. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3456 (1972). Fiscal 1972 figures
were not available.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 3801 (Supp.1973).
155. Id. at § 3811.
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upon their effectiveness in reducing the recidivism rate. 56' Both statutes include in their purpose clause a statement that the aim is to
reduce the commitment rate of juvenile delinquents by increasing
the effectiveness of the probation services.'57 Plans such as these are
consistent with the congressional findings and statement of purpose' 6 which preface the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, and with the increased national demand among the
professional commentators for less incarceration and more community-based local rehabilitation centers.' 9
If the nation and the individual states rearrange their fiscal priorities to recognize the nature and proportions of the juvenile delinquency problem, if the states effectively solicit and utilize federal
money, and if the states offer financial incentives to the local communities to deal directly with the problems on the community level,
the budgetary considerations should be less onerous than they
might first appear.
V.

Conclusion

It is essential to proceed with hope and confidence that our youth
problems are not insurmountable. No one plan or group of plans
provides a panacea for dealing with juvenile offenders, but a massive commitment of persons, time and money is definitely required.
Goal-oriented pragmatism is an appropriate philosophy for solving
the problem, but it must be tempered with a strong philosophy of
"best interests of the child" while trying to achieve that goal. If this
philosophy succeeds in its truest sense, real rehabilitation should
result.
156. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 1820-26 (West 1972); WAsH REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 13.06 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
157. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.06-010 (Supp. 1972); CAL. WELF. &
1820 (West 1972).
42 U.S.C. § 3801 (1968).
See note 77 supra.
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